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1 The Rise of Modern Finance 
As Mehrling says ‘the world of the new modern finance theory was a world in 
which both expectations hypothesis (EH) and uncovered interest parity (UIP) were 
expected to hold’ (Mehrling, 2011: 86). Under EH, the long-term interest rate is 
defined in terms of the short-term rate and a constant risk premium. Under UIP, a 
low interest rate currency is expected to appreciate, and a high interest rate 
currency to depreciate. For efficient market hypothesis (EMH) theorists, these 
anomalies were short-lived phenomena that would be arbitraged when sufficient 
capital was drawn in, and global imbalances would be resolved through price 
adjustments via free-floating exchange rates (Friedman, 1953; Fama, 1991). There 
is no explanation for long-term carry trades, persistent asset bubbles or zero lower 
bounds, and no theory to explain financial crises. 
Provided the central bank maintains a liquid payments system, private banks 
can exploit EH and UIP through carry trades that ‘borrow in low-interest rate 
currencies and lend in high-interest-rate currencies, borrow in short-term markets 
and lend in long-term markets, borrow at the risk-free rate and invest in risky 
bonds… significantly, all of these arbitrage trades depended on the availability of 
funding liquidity’ (Mehrling, 2011: 86). The central bank maintains liquidity by 
stepping in as ‘dealer of last resort’ when capital markets diverge from expected 
behaviour. Hence the central bank provides an implicit guarantee for speculators 
should EH and UIP fail, both providing liquidity and underpinning debt markets.  
This world of modern finance saw the birth of New Consensus 
Macroeconomics (NCM) ‘after the collapse of the Grand Neoclassical Synthesis in 
the 1970s’ (Arestis, 2009: 2), of Bretton Woods, and of the gold standard. Instead, 
the US Dollar became the world’s reserve currency. Under NCM, international 
capital markets did not need to be regulated because a floating exchange rate 
would adjust prices and clear markets. Economists needed to solve a different 
problem: to forecast price inflation. The Bank of England (BoE), in describing 
their inflation forecast model, expressed this quite clearly when they said ‘as the 
economy is completely small and open in capital markets, UIP is a standard no-
arbitrage condition that prices the exchange rate to equalise the return on riskless 
domestic and foreign bonds’(Harrison et al., 2005: 43).  
Yet despite theory, evidence against UIP had been building for years. Froot 
and Thaler found evidence of a negative correlation of –0.88, where high interest 
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rate currencies tended to appreciate (Froot and Thaler, 1990). In the literature, 
economists (Balassa, 1964; Samuelson, 1964; Fischer, 2002; Karadi and Koren, 
2008) sought explanations in productivity and real-world factors, and behavioural 
finance theory sought explanation in irrational trends (Schulmeister, 2006). The 
empirical failure of UIP is a central anomaly in finance, because it questions 
whether international capital markets are efficient. 
Some economists have since argued that a long-term asset price bubble is 
sustainable ‘because the interest rate is sufficiently low to provide repayment 
incentives' (Hellwig and Lorenzoni, 2009: 1137). Hellwig uses liquidity 
constrained actors in his model, rather than assuming liquidity is a ‘public good’. 
In his model, real world actors have no incentive to default, because they lose the 
ability to borrow in future periods. Instead, ‘interest rates adjust downwards to 
provide repayment incentives to all the potential borrowing parties. As a result, 
‘low interest rates emerge in equilibrium' and asset prices remain inflated. ‘The 
circulation of fiat money requires that an intrinsically useless asset (a rational 
bubble) is traded at a positive price’ (Hellwig and Lorenzoni, 2009: 1157).  
Neither does EMH take account of the business cycle or banking regulation. 
Outside EMH, Minsky’s ‘financial instability hypothesis’ (FIH) had proposed that 
capitalist economies move from hedge finance towards speculative and 
(ultimately) Ponzi finance. This would be a falsifiable hypothesis if there were 
public information on the flows, assets/liabilities, and financial obligations of all 
of the actors in an economy. Minsky hinted at how this might be done. ‘It can be 
shown that if hedge financing dominates, then the economy may well be an 
equilibrium seeking and containing system. In contrast, the greater the weight of 
speculative and Ponzi finance, the greater the likelihood that the economy is a 
deviation amplifying system’ (Minsky, 1992: 7).  
This paper proceeds by extending the Theory of the Monetary Circuit to give a 
mathematical representation of FIH, without assuming any causality. It uses this 
Extended Monetary Circuit to gain insights into the carry trade, austerity, banking 
regulation, interest rate policy and the possibility of stable high (and low) interest 
rate economies. While not directly attacking the theory of loanable funds, the 
Ponzi economy presents a scenario where demand for loans is countered by 
increased supply (lower reserve ratios) rather than higher loan prices. If the central 
bank maintains liquidity by lending freely, a persistent, low interest rate asset 
bubble is possible. 
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2 They Saw It Coming: The Theory of the Monetary Circuit 
There were economists and analysts who ‘saw this (crisis) coming’ by considering 
the stocks and flows between different sectors of the economy. ‘Accounting (or 
flow-of-funds) macroeconomic models helped anticipate the credit crisis and 
economic recession. Equilibrium models ubiquitous in mainstream policy and 
research did not’ (Bezemer, 2010: 676). For this group, economics cannot be 
reduced to ‘methodological individualism’ (Passarella, 2012: 3) because different 
economic sectors have different roles.  
Bezemer suggests that “the accounting approach’ within ‘Post-Keynesian’ 
economics shared by Godley, Baker, Hudson, Keen and others seems to have been 
particularly predictively successful” (Bezemer, 2010: 679). The approach in this 
paper is implemented using the methodology of Godley and Lavoie (G&L) where 
’everything comes from somewhere and everything goes somewhere’ (Godley and 
Lavoie, 2007: 6). As a minimum, the G&L models have three sectors: banks, 
households and businesses, where there ‘cannot be any black hole…. the fact that 
money stocks and flows must satisfy accounting identities in individual budgets 
and in an economy as a whole provides a fundamental law of macroeconomics 
analogous to the principle of conservation of energy in physics’ (Godley and 
Lavoie, 2007: 14). 
The G&L models are consistent with the Theory of the Monetary Circuit, 
which is attributed to Graziani (1989) and the ‘French and Italian post-Keynesian 
school, the so-called circuitistes’ (Godley and Lavoie, 2007: 47). In the original 
form of the Monetary Circuit, the first step is when banks lend to businesses. 
Businesses use this initial finance to buy labour. The initial circuit closes when 
households spend their wages, either on immediate consumption, or by purchasing 
financial assets that have been issued by businesses. In subsequent circuits, 
businesses only borrow the additional money they need to finance production. 
Although the role of credit money was re-emphasised after the collapse of Bretton 
Woods (Graziani, 1989), there is evidence across Europe and Asia that for the last 
five thousand years there has been a ‘broad alternation between periods dominated 
by credit money and periods in which gold and silver come to dominate’ (Graeber, 
2009: 213).   
In discussing the role of banks, Graziani emphasised that 'in any model of a 
monetary economy, banks and firms cannot be aggregated into one single sector' 
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(Graziani, 1989: 519). He considers four agents i) a central bank ii) private banks 
ii) firms and iv) wage-earners or households. Stocks of non-commodity money are 
increased or decreased by the debt and credit operations taking place between the 
Central Bank and private banks. With a single bank, there is ‘an unlimited credit 
potential, and ... no risk of insolvency’ (Graziani, 1989: 524).  With more than one 
bank, ‘there is (still) no limit to the amount of bank-money which the banks can 
safely create, provided that they move forward in step’ (Keynes, 1930, quoted in 
Graziani, 1989: 524). 
With unlimited credit, Godley and Lavoie argue that long-run, global 
imbalances are possible between economies, provided the central bank of the 
surplus country is able (and willing) to buy the debts of the deficit country. In a 
model which they liken to China and the US, there is no intrinsic limit to the 
process where ‘Chinese exporters receive, for their increased sales abroad, an 
additional flow of dollars which they exchange with their central bank for their 
own currency... (the Chinese central bank) exchanges these for US Treasury bills. 
Beyond these two exchanges, the People’s Bank of China neither needs nor wants 
to do anything at all’ (Godley and Lavoie, 2007: 470).  
Banks can generate monetary profits from the circuit indefinitely, ‘even if their 
ventures are 100% debt-financed’ (Keen, 2010: 4). Keen simulates the effects of 
an exogenous injection of money into either i) the bank vault or ii) household 
deposit accounts, to gain insights into the crisis (see Table 1). 
Following the principle that ’everything comes from somewhere and 
everything goes somewhere’, each of the flows (a i) results in a debit or credit on 
one or more accounts. Keen’s system is dynamic: notes flow to firms from the 
bank vault, firms pay wages and interest, and workers receive wages and interest. 
Critically, both banks and households consume. This consumption allows firms to 
repay their loans and close the circuit.  
Using estimated model parameters, Keen simulates the effects of injecting 
government money into either bank vaults or worker deposits. He concludes that 
injecting money into worker deposits to ‘go early, go hard, go households’, 
(Gruen, 2008, quoted in Keen, 2010: 22) would have a more immediate and 
substantial effect during crises.  
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Table 1: Keen’s Core Model 








1 Lend money Flow -       
2 Record loan Account       
3 Compound debt Account       
4 Pay interest Flow         
5 Record payment Account        
6 Deposit interest Flow         
7 Wages Flow         
8 Deposit interest  Flow         
9 Consumption Flow          
 
   
10 Repay loan Flow         
11 Record payment Account        
12 Government policy Exogenous 
injection 
into either 
   or    
    +   
+       
 ∑      + 
  
     
   
   
     
 
   
    
    
   
   
      
Adapted from (Keen, 2010: 24) 
This paper repeats those simulations with an extended circuit, and includes a 
simulated Keynesian boost. In the extended circuit there is a second, household 
circuit where banks lend to households, and households invest in property. Bank 
and household spending are treated as the redundant equations, to gain insights 
into banking regulation. 
3 Circuit Theory Extended 
In their growth model prototype, Godley and Lavoie ‘assume that households as 
well as firms borrow from banks’ (Godley and Lavoie, 2007: 378) but these new 
loans are determined, not by asset prices, but as a proportion of disposable income. 
This extension relaxes that constraint. 
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Indeed, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011: 62) showed how 
financial sector wages outstripped non-financial, starting in the 1980s. This 
combination of a relative fall in wages, rising asset prices, and rising household 
loans, was also apparent in the UK. A member of the Monetary Policy Committee, 
Wadwhani, criticised the Bank of England (BOE) for using interest rates to rein in 
a house price bubble (Wadhwani, 2000: 300). He argued that high interest rates 
were making things worse. With open capital markets, international capital was 
attracted in search of carry, boosting household lending. 
Angeriz and Arestis make a similar argument that asset bubbles do matter. The 
UK current account had been ‘in deficit for nearly 20 years and for most of the last 
30 years, more or less since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods agreement and 
the generalised floating of exchange rates’ (Select Committee on Economic 
Affairs, 2004: 26). Not only had exchange rates failed to adjust to reduce these 
imbalances, but inflation targeting had failed spectacularly in the past: price 
stability had preceded the 1930s Great Depression in the USA, the problems in 
Japan in the early 1990s, and the bursting of the dotCom bubble in March 2001 
(Angeriz and Arestis, 2007: 871-873).  
In the extended circuit, investment gains provide a boost to spending. Banks 
spend their surplus income, which places them in competition for consumption and 
financial assets. Spending has two elements, i) immediate consumption and ii) 
deferred consumption which is invested in financial assets. The model allows for 
multiple investment markets, with different levels of investment gain. There is no 
limit to the further disaggregation of sectors, or to the addition of new financial 
assets. Therefore the impact of any asset bubble, in any sector, can be modelled.  
Keen, and Godley and Lavoie, have already introduced the possibility of 
modelling economic shocks, because they included ‘real world’ flows like wages. 
An extreme shock might be a natural disaster or epidemic that wipes out 
households or business assets, impacting the ability of firms to produce and sell 
goods. As a consequence, loans do not get repaid and the circuit does not close. 
Predictable events can also be modelled: demographic trends from ageing and 
improving healthcare, and perhaps even migration due to climate change. 
Accounting models also introduce the possibility of simulating the effect of taxes 
(on wages, investment and lending), and step changes in behaviour or expectations 
(such as new financial products that alter loan characteristics). The extended 
model retains these features. 
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In the extended model, the role of government is an intermediate state: funded 
by both loans and the taxing of stocks and flows. Government spending therefore 
impacts both circuits, and there is the possibility of simulating these interventions 
and distortions in future work. Lastly, the extended model includes the impact of 
inflation in asset prices, wages, commodity prices and consumer goods. 
~ 
The extended circuit has three sectors (households, banks and businesses) that can 
make hedge, speculative and Ponzi investments, where: 
i. The hedge borrowers repay their loans from realised investment cash flows. 
ii. The speculative borrowers repay their loans from realised investment cash 
flows. However, they roll over their debts regularly, re-investing capital 
gains to produce (businesses), or using them to boost spending 
(households). 
iii. The Ponzi borrowers rely on their investments being profitable. In doing so, 
they do not wait until profits are realised. In a simple, accounting sense, they 
use unrealised cash flows to increase production (businesses) or spending 
(households). 
iv. Inflation is everywhere. 
The models assume that investment markets do not clear fully, and that each 
sector has different motives for borrowing. In the household circuit, households 
borrow to invest in property, and defer a proportion of their spending (pensions). 
In the ‘real world’, some households might go further, and leverage their loans to 
invest in financial assets, while other households might rent. 
Following Graziani, in the business circuit, firms require initial finance to pay 
wages and begin production. In subsequent phases, firms raise capital by issuing 
financial assets, and use loans to invest in financial assets (such as commodities). 
Hedge businesses repay initial finance when the full production cycle ends.   
Bank loans have a higher priority than equity in a bankruptcy, and this pecking 
order differentiates between loan and investment accounts. In the ‘real world’, the 
distinction is more nuanced. Ultimately, however, the central bank steps in if 
hedge businesses and households cannot roll over their loans, to avert a liquidity 
crisis.  
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3.1 Hedge Economy 
In the first model of a hedge economy, borrowers repay their loans from realised 
investment cash flows. Households pay for consumption from wages, and sell their 
investments (property) to re-pay their loans and close that part of the circuit. If 
households are hedging, their spending across the sector is less than wages. 
Deferred household spending (pensions) is an investment in the business cycle. In 
other words, the role of business is to borrow and invest across the full production 
cycle, to smooth aggregate, lifetime consumption.  
Hedge businesses invest in productive assets, pay wages and buy goods and 
services from other businesses. The aggregate consumption of businesses is zero, 
and the business circuit is closed when household consumption ceases (so all 
goods and services have been sold). The household circuit closes when households 
repay their loans. 
Lastly, hedge banks do not invest. They simply maintain a reserve ratio, create 
loans, receive loan interest, divert any excess into bank spending and ‘close the 
circuit’ when loans are fully repaid (see Table 2).  
For simplicity, households and businesses are assumed to borrow the same 
initial finance. Later, the ratio of household to business loans is discussed, but this 
simplifying assumption leads to some stylised facts about the loan payment 
preferences of households, banks and businesses. 
Table 2: Hedge Model 
Transaction Banks Households Businesses ∑ 
 Current Capital Current Loan Current Loan  
Create loan   res   res –             a 0 
Loan 
payment 
                         0 
Wages   +∆a.    – a.    0 
Spending – a.       a.     + a.    




  res   res +∆a –∆a +∆a –∆a 0 
∑ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Where  res = reserves, -   = loans,                                   (the ratio of wages: 
business loans),                              (the ratio of household spending to household 
loans),                         (the ratio of bank spending to loans).  
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In the tradition of Godley and Lavoie, all of the rows and columns sum to zero. 
As a consequence, one of the equations can be treated as redundant. Giving this 
treatment to spending gives insight into the behaviour of banks and households, as 
follows (see Table 3). 
Provided households and businesses meet their loan repayment schedules, 
banks sustain their spending from loan payments. In a model without asset price 
inflation, households and businesses do not make investment gains and the model 
has no investment or inflation risk.  
There is no need for banks to hold reserves, provided bank spending remains 
within the limits set by the circuit, namely: 
Bank spending (     =        (1) 
As the loan payment rate (    approaches zero, bank spending also approaches 
zero.  
On the other hand, since 
Household spending       = ∆a.      ) (2) 
As the loan payment rate (    approaches zero, household spending increases. 
In other words, banks prefer higher loan payment rates, whereas households prefer 
lower loan payment rates and higher wages.  
However, the loan payment rate is itself determined by central bank policy and 
regulation, in particular the central bank rate (      As the central bank rate rises, 
some businesses, households and governments will be unable to repay their loans. 
This is represented in the model as a default rate (    . Since the model has no 
 
Table 3: Spending in Hedge Model  
Transaction Banks Households Businesses ∑ 
 Current Capital Current Loan Current Loan  
Create loan   res   res               a 0 
Loan 
payment 
                         0 
Wages   +∆a.    – a.    0 
Spending           ∆a.      )  + a.   +   )  0 
Repay 
principal 
  res   res +∆a –∆a +∆a –∆a 0 
∑ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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investment risk, banks can recoup capital losses by selling assets, but they cannot 
recoup missed loan (interest) payments. Lastly, the duration of loans (    to 
households and businesses can increase or decrease. As loan durations 
(    decrease, loan payments increase (and vice-versa). In summary: 
Bank spending =           
          
  
   (3) 
What is the impact of inflation on the model? Since each term is a function of 
∆a or  res inflation is everywhere. Different levels of inflation in asset prices, 
wages, commodity prices and consumer goods make the model non-ergodic. If 
inflation is zero, loans get repaid and the circuit closes. With asset price deflation, 
loan payments increase in proportion to loans and banks become more liquid. With 
asset price inflation, banks need to increase loans (∆a) to maintain their spending. 
With hyperinflation, loans never get repaid and banks become illiquid. Assuming 
inflation is everywhere and constant, the impact of inflation is through loan 
durations (    where: 
                     (4) 
                (5) 
The equations for household and bank spending create an obvious upper and 
lower bound where i) the central bank rate       must be greater than 0% for bank 
spending to be positive ii) the loan payment rate      must be less than the wage 
rate      for household spending to be positive. In the ‘real’ world, there is also a 
living wage       such that: 
          ) (6) 
Such that low wages and high loan payment rates can drive households into 
speculative and Ponzi behaviour, to maintain a living wage. 
The model has two other interesting features. Businesses, if they seek to 
increase total spending, are split between raising wages, and a preference for 
higher loan payment rates, since: 
Total spending =  a.   +   )  (7) 
This is because higher loan payment rates      increase bank spending, but 
exert downward pressure on wages because loan payments by businesses increase. 
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Both businesses and households prefer an increase in lending to businesses. 
This is illustrated by separating household and business loans in the spending 
formulae, as shown in Table 4. 
Table 4: Preferences in Hedge Model  
Transaction Banks Households Businesses ∑ 
Spending                  ∆  .          +      +     0 
Where                      and                      
 
An increase in household lending (     will reduce household spending, but 
has no impact on total spending. So it is only banks that prefer an increase in 
household lending. 
In summary (Table 5): 
Table 5: Preferences by Sector 




Central bank rate 
      
Higher Lower Split between 
higher loan 
payment rates to 
raise bank 
spending, and 
lower to raise 
household spending 
Loan duration (     
and inflation 
Lower  Higher 
Repayment default 
rate        
Lower Higher 









The hedge economy model shows that the central bank rate, and ratio of 
household to business loans, are not politically neutral. Hedge banks prefer higher 
loan payment rates to increase their spending. Hedge households prefer lower loan 
payment rates, to minimise their borrowing costs. Businesses are split. Lower loan 
payment rates mean they can pay higher wages to boost household spending, but 
higher rates also mean higher bank spending. 
A stable hedge economy might have occupational pensions, stable healthcare, 
wages and demographics, consistent inflation, and good banking regulation (with 
steady default rates and loan durations). To close the business circuit, external 
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spending would need to be neutral or negative across the full productive cycle. 
With these characteristics, a hedge economy could sustain a wide range of central 
bank rates, including a stable, high interest rate economy should the household 
sector have less political influence that the banks. 
The model also suggests that credit easing/rationing and wage policies are 
necessary macroeconomic tools. The wage rate (    varies between different 
economies and sectors. A capital-intensive sector, such as manufacturing, might 
have a lower wage rate. On the other hand, where sectors rely heavily on labour, 
such as education and government services, if the wage rate is too low then 
household spending is reduced. 
Of course, in the new world of modern finance, loanable funds are not solely 
distributed by the banking system, and the model needs extending to take account 
of resource allocation through investment markets. This is the traditional Arrow-
Debreu model, and the next section introduces speculative investment. 
3.2 Speculative Economy 
In this speculative economy model, loans are invested in assets. Following the 
definition given by Minsky, speculative households do not spend investment gains 
until they have been realised. Households continue to make loan payments and to 
fund spending from wages, but they also roll over their loans regularly by selling 
their assets and spending the realised investment gains. This revision allows 
borrowers to speculate on their capital accounts. Investment gains (           can 
be positive or negative, and investment gains make no distinction between capital 
gains (losses) from asset price inflation; investment returns such as dividends on 
equities; coupon payments on bonds; or interest on deposit accounts. 
Speculative businesses also invest their loans in assets, which might include 
commodities or other businesses in their supply chain. They use these productive 
investments to produce goods and services, and pay wages and loans. They can 
also buy and sell investments, and spend realised investment gains. 
Initially, banks are not speculating in this model and inflation is everywhere, as 
before. This yields the results shown in Table 6. 
With speculative household and businesses, a number of survival constraints 
become apparent. 
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Since we are interested in spending, that row is treated as the redundant 
equation (Table 7).  
Table 6: Speculative Model 
Transaction Banks Households Businesses ∑ 
 Current Capital Current Investment Current Investment  
Create loan   res   res               a 0 
Loan 
payment 
                         0 
Investment 
gain 
        
     
                0 
Wages   +∆a.    – a.    0 
Re-finance        
     
       
     
                            0 
Spending – a.     – a.     + a.    




  res   res +∆a –∆a +∆a –∆a 0 
∑ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 7: Spending in Speculative Model 
Trans-
action 
Banks Households Businesses ∑ 





Create loan   res   res               a 0 
Loan 
payment 
                         0 
Investment 
gain 
        
     
                0 
Wages   +∆a.    - a.    0 
Re-finance        
     
       
     
                            0 
Spending   a.
      
       
 –  a. 
(   
       
 + a.(   
+   




  res   res +∆a –∆a +∆a –∆a 0 
∑ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
With speculative households and businesses, a number of survival constraints 
become apparent. 
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The loan payment rate (    at which the banking sector does not become 
illiquid is now a function of the loan size      and investment gains      in all 
investment markets: 
      
 
             +                            (8) 
In the simple example above, where households and businesses borrow the 
same amount: 
Bank spending    
          
  
  
       
 
   (9) 
As before, speculative banks are likely to prefer higher central bank rates, 
lower loan defaults and shorter loan durations. Additionally, speculative banks will 
prefer lower investment gains (          . Alternatively, they can lobby to invest 
in markets where they expect to achieve investment gains that are higher than their 
cost of borrowing. Since private banks have information on capital flows to (and 
from) investment markets, they are well-placed to benefit from such speculation. 
Banks need to defer spending to ensure they have enough capital to pay 
realised gains to households and businesses. In other words, banks need to hold 
suitable levels of reserves, or investment markets will not clear. Businesses and 
households also need to defer some spending until they have realised investment 
gains. If they do not, some businesses and households will become insolvent 
(Table 8). 
The effect of speculation is therefore i) a reduction (or deferment) of spending 
until investment gains are realised, ii) the possibility of zero or negative bank 
spending, with banks that are precariously liquid/illiquid (Equation 8), or iii) the 
more plausible possibility that speculation increases liquidity problems, which 
leads to monetary expansion. 
Households continue to prefer an increase in     a reduction in   , and a 
reduction in    . Banks prefer an increase in    and all loans. As before, 
 
Table 8: Preferences in Speculative Model  
Transaction Banks Households Businesses ∑ 
Spending              
             
 ∆  .           
    
+      +        0 
Where                                            
                                                                        . 
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households and businesses share a preference for higher business loans      . 
There are three main differences from the hedge economy, however: 
1) Banks lobby to invest in markets, where they expect to achieve investment 
gains that are higher than their cost of borrowing 
2) Banks prefer to lend in sectors where returns are low, and to invest in sectors 
where returns are high: the carry trade 
3) Compared to the hedge model, total spending is reduced by         
Speculative businesses can still close their circuit, but they do so by realising 
their investment gains.  
3.3 Ponzi Economy 
In the third model, sectors do not wait until investment markets clear before 
spending their gains. If households are spending more than they receive in wages, 
then spending is being supported by unrealised investment gains (so the house or 
pension assets have not been sold): the model defines this as Ponzi household 
spending. In practice, this Ponzi spending is both voluntary (households who cash 
in on investment gains without selling assets) and involuntary (household forced to 
borrow on credit cards, to miss mortgage payments or run up an overdraft, to avoid 
their spending dropping below the living wage constraint (Equation 6)).  
Ponzi businesses increase borrowing on the strength of unrealised investment 
gains. In practice, the lines between current, loan and investment accounts are 
blurred, but the important factors are that unlike loan interest, investment gains are 
unpredictable and not contractual. Ponzi businesses might use loans to invest in 
financial assets, like derivatives, where there is no delivery. So while speculators 
invest in futures and forwards up to the delivery date; Ponzi investors will increase 
loans on the strength of unrealised gains, such as those in option markets. 
For simplicity, the model assumes two extremes with a defined relationship 
between             . These are: 
Bubble formation, where 
      
 
 >     (10) 
Bubble collapse, where 
      
 
      (11) 
If we define        as excess gain/loss then 
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Household investment gain      =          (12) 
Business investment gain      =         (13) 
For simplicity,        are either positive or negative across all markets (Table 9). 
Technically, bank spending now relies on their ability to manage reserves, 
since the last row no longer sums to zero. Banks, businesses and household spend 
their unrealised gains: there is no longer an accounting identity. The circuit never 
closes and households and bank capital varies by: 
                  (14) 
in each productive cycle. 
Banks can continue to lend provided they remain liquid and solvent, which 
includes the new constraint that: 
 res >                   (15) 
Since  res is largely comprised of government debt then, provided the loan 
base expands, a solvent Ponzi circuit is perfectly plausible. Solvency is a balance 
between increasing  res, reducing loan payment rates      and having markets with 
low (or negative) excess investment gains           Hence, the possibility of a 
stable, low interest rate economy emerges.  
Since we are interested in bank spending, this is treated as the redundant 
equation.   
For there to be any bank spending (where banks themselves are not speculative 
or Ponzi): 
                  (16) 
As in the speculative economy, banks prefer to invest in markets where excess 
gains (       are positive, and to lend in markets where excess gains (       are 
negative: the carry trade. 
During bubble formation, solvency requires that new reserves are created 
(Equation 14). During bubble collapse, if households do not increase spending 
above wages (Table 10) the business circuit does not close. Without debt-fuelled 
household spending, businesses are unable to meet their loan and wage 
obligations.  
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Table 9: Ponzi Model 
Transaction Banks Households Businesses ∑ 
 Current Capital Current Investment Current Investment  
Create loan   res   res               a 0 
Loan 
payment 
                         0 
Investment 
gain 
        
    
      
        
      
        
      
 0 
Wages   +∆a.    –  a.    0 
Spending –  a.     – a.     + a.    
+ a.    
 0 
∑   res         
    
      
           
      
  a        
      
0 
Table 10: Preferences in Ponzi Model 
Transaction Banks Households Businesses ∑ 
Spending        
         
–∆  .          +∆  .           0 
 
Since: 
Total spending = ∆  .            (17) 
Ponzi businesses prefer that excess business gain      is negative. In other 
words, Ponzi businesses prefer that their total investment gains are less than      
Paradoxically, banks are able to spend and rebuild reserves during systemic 
crises, since bank spending (Equation 16) is positive if excess gains       ) are 
negative.  
In summary, bank solvency in a Ponzi economy is aided by i) banks 
speculating on carry trades ii) the creation of new reserves during bubble 
formation ii) the rebuilding of banks’ balance sheets during systemic crises. 
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4 Simulations 
The following sections estimate parameters for the hedge economy model, and 
then simulate a range of bailout tests as per Keen (2010), with the addition of a 
Keynesian boost. 
The model parameters are estimated as follows: 
i.  res (total bank reserves). For the sake of convention, bank reserves are 
set at 10%, although in a hedge economy reserves are not necessary.  
ii.         (the ratio of household loans to business loans). A single loan 
payment rate (    is used with    =    , as above. The actual ratio of 
household to business loans is estimated and discussed (below).  
iii. Taxes. To model the government sector, the model would benefit from 
adding taxes to both flows and stocks. This exercise is beyond this paper, 
but it is important to note that in the UK and US, liability (loan) flows 
have some of the lowest tax rates, and different tax rates will distort any 
equilibria.   
iv.      oan payment rate). This is a function of the central bank rate 
       oan duration (     and repayment default rate      . Although 
UK and US household mortgages tend to be long duration, banks were 
increasingly using securitization to originate and distribute. In the 
simulations, a loan payment rate of 4% is used. This is close to the 
average UK and US central bank rate (1970 2010). It is also the rate at 
which a principal is repaid over 25 years in a hedge model without 
inflation. 
v.    (ratio of annual wages to business loans). This figure is estimated 
using real data for the UK and US (below). To simulate ‘sticky’ wages, 
the model tests what happens if wages do not decline below their initial 
value.  
vi.     (household spending). Since these are hedge economy simulations, 
household spending equals residual wages after loan payments. In 
speculative and Ponzi economies, households would also spend 
investment gains. 
vii.     (bank spending). Hedge banks spend income in excess of reserve 
requirements. This is a broad definition of bank spending, including 
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capital flows into business investments (equities and corporate debt). 
Bank spending includes the investment of loan income surpluses. 
Estimates of the wage rate       and the household to business loans ratio 
         , follow. For the US, data are taken from the Federal Reserve and US 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Three values are used i) wage and salary 
disbursements, ii) household and non-profit liabilities and ii) non-financial 
business liabilities. 
From the early 1980s, there is a marked decoupling of household loans from 
wages in the US. This is similar to the decoupling of financial and non-financial 
wages (The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011: 62). This alternative 
graph has other nuances, namely i) a ‘heart attack’ in 1973–74 that corresponds to 
the collapse of Bretton Woods ii) an accelerated decoupling in the US after the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act (Figure 1) 
Figure 1: US Wage Rate and Household Loan Ratio 
 
Sources: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Federal Reserve 
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These results are consistent with the hypothesis that, after the repeal of the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act,     (loan payment rate for households) 
increased, and     (loan payment rate for businesses) decreased. There are several 
possible explanations for this. New household loan practices to originate and 
distribute would reduce the perception of default risk (      and loan durations 
(   . At the same time, increased business investment outside the US might 
increase the perception of business default risk (    , and loan duration (   … in 
particular, if long-term business investment were needed. 
For the UK, the Office for National Statistics does not provide data prior to 
1987, nor do they provide monthly figures. The equivalent figures used are i) real 
households disposable income ii) liabilities of households and non-profit 
institutions serving households and iii) liabilities of non-financial corporations. 
The UK wage rate also declines, and relative household loans increase from 
1998 2008. Consistent with the post-Keynesian tradition, there is no ‘one-size-
fits-all’ economic model; UK household lending peaked later than the US, and 
there was a marked decline in business lending around the Asian financial crisis 
(1998) (Figure 2). 
Figure 2: UK Wage Rate and Household Loan Ratio 
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The UK graph is consistent with a structural break in FDI flows around 
1997    8, which Ferreiro et al. (2012) attributed to a ‘worldwide relocation of 
production of tradeable goods’ that ‘is a structural-nature process that cannot be 
resolved with short-term measures like exchange rate adjustments or 
macroeconomic (fiscal-monetary) policies’ (Ferreiro et al., 2012: 25-33). 
~ 
The following simulations ask what happens if i) banks are bailed out ii) 
households are bailed out or iii) there is an increase in business investment 
(loans)? In each simulation, bailout money is spent at the rate of 25% per year 
(Table 11). 
To model a bank bailout,  res is increased by 50 (to 70). If banks do not run 
down reserves, there is no impact (Figure 3). 
If banks follow a reserve ratio rule, and spend 25% of any excess reserves 
(with a 10% reserve requirement) the result is a boost to bank spending and 
downward pressure on wages. If households resist this (wages are ‘sticky’) the 
result is a drop in household spending: austerity (Figure 4). 
To model the injection of capital in the household sector,     is reduced by 50 
(capital is injected at a rate of 25% of the remainder each year, to match the bank 
bailout simulations). Since households spend their wages, less any loan payments, 
the result is a reduction in bank spending and an increase in household spending. 
There is no downward pressure on wages (Figure 5). 
Table 11: Parameters for Bailout Simulations 
Parameter Description Value 
 res Total bank reserves 20 
    Total loans to households 100 
    Total loans to businesses 100 
   Annual wages/business loans 25% 
   Bank loan rate 4% 
         Long-run equilibrium of business to household loans 1 
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Figure 3: Bank Bailouts with no increase in Bank Spending  
 
 
Figure 4: Bank Bailouts with Bank Reserves Rule and ‘Sticky’ Wages 
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Figure 5: Household Bailouts 
 
Figure 6: A Keynesian Boost 
 
Finally, business loans     are increased by 50. To match the household and 
bank bailouts, the increased lending is at the rate of 25% of the remainder each 
year. The result is a boost to business investment and household spending (via 
wages), which suggests it could be inflationary (Figure 6). 
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These results are consistent with Keen. Bailing out the banks with public 
money boosts bank spending, not the economy, and has the unfortunate 
consequence that there is downward pressure on wages and household spending.  
Bailing out hedge households diverts household flows from loan payments to 
spending. Boosting business loans, provided the wage rate increases, also boosts 
household spending. Which policy is the most appropriate would depend on 
monetary policy objectives. Bailing out hedge households is a form of monetary 
contraction, and boosting business loans is a form of monetary expansion with 
inflationary effects.   
5 Conclusions 
Using accounting techniques in macroeconomics appears to offer valuable 
insights. The co-existence of multiple, non-ergodic economies seems possible. The 
central bank rate is not the only important factor: the wage rate, ratio of household 
to business loans, duration of loans, loan defaults, inflation (in asset prices, wages, 
commodities and consumer goods), taxes, investment gains, and government 
interventions can alter the equilibrium of an economy. There is room in such 
models for concepts such as ‘sticky’ wages, consumer confidence, and to account 
for shocks such as demographic change. The different behaviour of sectors, where 
they adopt hedge, speculative or Ponzi forms of finance, also affects the 
equilibrium. Tax policies matter, because they incentivise speculators to find 
alternative investments. In particular, preferential tax treatment of financial assets 
and loans might encourage their expansion over productive investment. 
A theoretical analysis suggests that a stable, high interest rate, hedge economy 
can emerge where a predominance of hedge households and businesses ensure 
liquidity and support high levels of bank spending. Hedge banks prefer a higher 
central bank rate, lower loan durations, lower inflation and lower default rates. 
Hedge households prefer the opposite. 
In a speculative economy, banks are incentivised to enter investment markets 
where returns are high. If they do not, they risk becoming illiquid. In a speculative 
economy, businesses and households can still close the circuit, but total spending 
is reduced by an amount equivalent to business investment gains (       .  
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The possibility of a stable, low interest rate, Ponzi economy also emerges. 
Here, loans do not get repaid. As investment bubbles form, banks must reduce 
reserves or expand loans for the system to remain liquid.  The paradox of a Ponzi 
economy is that, if asset prices collapse (and, with an increasing number of 
investment markets, there are more possibilities) then banks can resume spending 
and increase their reserves. This is because Ponzi households and businesses get 
less non-commodity money for their investments. The banks remain liquid and 
solvent provided: 
 res >                   (15) 
In a Ponzi economy, bank solvency is aided by i) banks speculating on carry 
trades ii) the creation of new reserves (monetary expansion) during bubble 
formation ii) the rebuilding of banks’ balance sheets during systemic crises. 
The hedge economy simulations show that a Keen-type bailout to ‘go early, go 
hard, go households' is an effective way to contract the monetary base. A 
Keynesian boost to business investment (loans) is also effective, providing 
businesses increase wages. 
The choice between a Keen-type bailout and Keynesian boost might depend on 
the external balance. To reduce imports, a Keynesian boost could increase 
domestic production, benefitting the household sector through wages. If exports 
are high, then a Keen-type bailout would impact household spending directly, and 
reduce the external surplus. Bank bailouts are the least effective, exerting 
downward pressure on wages and/or household spending: austerity. 
Financial regulation also matters. With international Ponzi banks, there is a 
significant problem if an investment market collapses. By definition, Ponzi banks 
have already spent their unrealised profits. Somehow, the international payments 
system needs to clear Ponzi debts and remove Ponzi agents. The solutions might 
include reparations from Ponzi banks (     , turning Ponzi debt into equity or 
‘junk’ debt (     , and the household bailouts and Keynesian boosts described 
above.  
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